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New dams impact downstream ecosystems and water infrastructure; without
cooperative and adaptive management, negative impacts can manifest. In large
complex transboundary river basins without well codified operating rules and extensive
historical data, it can be difficult to assess the benefits of cooperating, in particular
in relation to new dams. This constitutes a barrier to harmonious development of
river basins and could contribute to water conflict. This study proposes a generalised
framework to assess the benefits of cooperation on the management of new dams
in water resource systems that do not have formal sharing arrangements. Benefits
are estimated via multi-criteria comparison of historical reservoir operations (usually
relatively uncooperative) vs. adopting new cooperative rules which would achieve the
best results for riparian countries as evaluated by a water resources simulator and
its performance metrics. The approach is applied to the Pwalugu Multipurpose Dam
(PMD), which is being built in Ghana in the Volta river basin. The PMD could impact
downstream ecosystems and infrastructure in Ghana and could itself be impacted by
how the existing upstream Bagre Dam is managed in Burkina Faso. Results show
that with cooperation Ghana and Burkina Faso could both increase energy production
although some ecosystem services loss would need to be mitigated. The study confirms
that cooperative rules achieve higher overall benefits compared to seeking benefits only
for individual dams or countries.
Keywords: hydropower and ecosystem service trade-offs, dam operating policies, many-objective trade-off
analysis, cooperation in transboundary water systems, Volta river basin
INTRODUCTION
Growing food, water and energy demand is fuelling the expansion of water resources infrastructure
such as dams (Zarfl et al., 2014; Siciliano et al., 2018; Gerlak et al., 2020). New infrastructure can
modify a river’s flow regime impacting benefits and services provided by existing downstream
infrastructure and natural assets like wetlands or floodplains. These often play a central role in
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the functioning of aquatic ecosystems and of local communities
by providing food and drinking water supply services (Mul
et al., 2017). Furthermore, new infrastructure can generate
or intensify conflicts between different basin stakeholders,
especially in transboundary river basins without cooperative
water management arrangements (Sadoff and Grey, 2009;
Basheer et al., 2018; Wheeler et al., 2018). In this context,
water resource systems models can be used to identify and
quantify the potential impacts of new infrastructure and different
operating policies of existing and new infrastructure (Loucks,
1992; Thiessen and Loucks, 1992).
Motivated by the need to identify the best possible approaches
to share transboundary waters, optimisation models have often
been used to filter through the nearly unlimited ways water
sharing rules could be structured and parametrised. Different
methods have been applied including linear optimisation
(e.g., Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann, 2004, 2010; Porse
et al., 2015), stochastic dynamic programming and stochastic
dual dynamic programming (e.g., Tilmant and Kinzelbach,
2012; Tilmant et al., 2012; Arjoon et al., 2014; Kahsay
et al., 2019). Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann (2004) use
a linear optimisation model to identify optimal allocation
of water resources in the Euphrates and Tigris river basin
considering water demands for irrigation, urban consumption
and hydropower generation, where the economic consequences
of different strategies with cooperative and non-cooperative
scenarios were assessed. Arjoon et al. (2014) use a stochastic dual
dynamic programming model to assess the hydro-economic risk
of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in the eastern
Nile river basin, where they demonstrated that if the riparian
countries (Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt) agree to cooperative
management in the basin, the GERD would increase the basin-
wide benefits, increasing water security in Sudan and Egypt
during dry years.
Other scholars have sought to more realistically represent
institutional realities and motivations within models. Methods
used in this vein include for example agent-based models (e.g.,
Becker and Easter, 1999; Kilgour and Dinar, 2001; Giuliani and
Castelletti, 2013; Yoon et al., 2021) and game theory (e.g., Bennett
et al., 1998; Bhaduri and Liebe, 2013; Bhagabati et al., 2014).
Giuliani and Castelletti (2013) presented a multiagent decision-
analytic framework to model and analyse different levels of
cooperation and information exchange among multiple decision
makers in the Zambezi river basin. Bhagabati et al. (2014)
investigated the net benefits of hydropower developments and
water resource utilisation in the Mekong transboundary river
basin using a game theory approach where different adaptation
strategies that benefit all riparian countries were proposed.
A potential advantage of game theory or agent-based methods
is their ability to represent more realistic scenarios of non-
cooperation and non-centralised management in transboundary
systems, involving multiple institutional or stakeholder interests.
These methods assume each agent or institution can give priority
to their own objectives and the interactions between parties
can be identified and described (Madani, 2010; Giuliani and
Castelletti, 2013). Optimisation techniques typically assume all
parties are willing to cooperate and exchange information to
achieve better system-wide outcomes; in practice this can be
unrealistic given the political and institutional contexts within
transboundary river basins (Giuliani and Castelletti, 2013).
Classical optimization, agent-based and game theory methods
may however be difficult to apply when representing large-scale
complex systems including non-linear physical and institutional
processes. In this case rule-based simulation of water resources
systems (Loucks, 1992; Loucks and Van Beek, 2005; Matrosov
et al., 2011) can be helpful because they do not require
assuming optimising behaviours and they can be applied
to large-scale complex real-world non-linear water systems,
coupling hydrological complexity with the complexity of human
water management rules. Simulation models allow to test
and refine management strategies through scenario simulation
and can incorporate water management impact information
from ecology, economics and stakeholder-informed metrics of
performance (Wurbs, 1993; Loucks and Van Beek, 2005; Harou
et al., 2009; Voinov et al., 2016). Water resource management
simulation models can help improve stakeholder understanding
of large-scale and complex systems and thereby contribute to
their design, management, and operation (Hall et al., 2019).
In the last decade hybrid simulation-optimisation methods
have become popular; this involves simulating a variety
of behaviours (without necessarily assuming optimising
agents), then linking simulators to external independent
search algorithms which help filter through the numerous
system design and management options whilst considering the
motivation and behaviours of simulated agents. Linking water
resources system simulators to multi-objective evolutionary
algorithms (MOEAs) has proven effective at allowing water
manager and planners to assess trade-offs among conflicting
objectives and explore strategies under multiple plausible future
scenarios (e.g., Kasprzyk et al., 2009; Herman et al., 2014; Zeff
et al., 2014; Matrosov et al., 2015; Huskova et al., 2016; Giuliani
et al., 2018; Wheeler et al., 2018; Geressu and Harou, 2019; Wild
et al., 2019). MOEAs use search techniques to approximate a
multidimensional Pareto front identifying a non-dominated
(“best achievable”) set of intervention strategies (Reed and
Kasprzyk, 2009; Maier et al., 2014, 2018). For the different system
design and/or management alternatives identified in the Pareto
front, an incremental change made to improve one objective
will come at the expense of one or more other objectives (i.e.,
the system has reached a level of system performance where
any further improvement will necessarily come at a cost). The
resulting multi-objective trade-off analysis can assist stakeholders
in managing or planning river system infrastructure and services.
Example applications, several of which are in Africa, include
(e.g., Hurford and Harou, 2014; Smith et al., 2015; Zeff et al.,
2016; Geressu et al., 2020; Hurford et al., 2020a,b).
To date, there have been relatively few multi-objective
trade-off studies in transboundary water systems seeking to
assess whether a new development in one country may or
may not conflict with benefits in others (Geressu and Harou,
2015; Wheeler et al., 2018). For example, Giuliani et al.
(2016a) explored the impact of different climate projections on
existing infrastructure in the Red river basin, shared by China
and Vietnam. They used many-objective Direct Policy Search
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(Giuliani et al., 2014) to identify optimal reservoir operations
that offset possible negative impacts on hydropower generation
in the basin. Wheeler et al. (2018) presented a framework to
evaluate the impact of the GERD in Ethiopia on the downstream
infrastructure in the eastern Nile basin. They coupled the Borg
MOEA (Hadka and Reed, 2013) with a hydro policy model
of the basin to explore different management infrastructure
strategies under different levels of cooperation between the
riparian countries. Schmitt et al. (2019) proposed a multi-
objective optimisation-based framework for planning dams in
the transboundary Mekong basin considering trade-offs between
sediment and hydropower.
This study builds on the multi-objective water system
design literature contributing a multi-objective framework for
evaluating impacts of new dams on the performance of
existing natural and built transboundary basin systems with
poorly codified operating rules. The proposed methodology is
divided into three stages. Stage one uses a policy identification
approach (Giuliani et al., 2014), based on many-objective
direct policy search, to identify historical operating policies
for existing infrastructure using observed operational data
(observed flow and storage volume); stage two, based on two
scenarios, cooperative and historical non-cooperative, identifies
optimal operational strategies for new infrastructure; finally, in
stage three, a stochastic evaluation of the operating policies
identified in stages one and two is conducted. The cooperative
scenario assumes transparent coordination between the riparian
countries and infrastructure operators through a central water
management institution in the basin. The historical non-
cooperative scenario omits coordination of historical operations
with new infrastructure. The framework is applied to the new
Pwalugu Multipurpose Dam (PMD), in Ghana, within the Volta
river basin. The new dam is designed to produce hydropower,
provide flood protection, food production and employment via a
new irrigation scheme. Our application aims to demonstrate how
formal synergistic operation of new and existing infrastructure
in the transboundary, multi-reservoir Volta basin could improve
water resource system ecosystem services for multiple actors.
The paper is organised as follows: section “The Volta River
Basin Context” presents a description of the Volta river basin;
section “Methods and Tools” introduces the Volta river basin
simulation model and describes the methods. Section “Results
and Discussion” presents and discusses results and section
“Conclusion” concludes.
THE VOLTA RIVER BASIN CONTEXT
Basin Description
The Volta river basin (Figure 1) is located in West Africa and
is shared by six riparian countries where Ghana and Burkina
Faso make up the largest area of 42 and 43%, respectively,
while the remaining 15% is distributed between Benin, Côte
d’Ivoire, Mali and Togo (Mul et al., 2015). The Volta’s total
average annual flow is approximately 40,400 [Mm3 year−1]
and making it one of the major rivers of Africa (McCartney
et al., 2012). The Volta’s water resources are used for irrigation,
hydropower generation, fisheries, domestic, industrial, mining,
livestock, and water transport. According to Mul et al. (2015),
and Baah-Kumi and Ward (2020) different factors such as high
population growth, climate change, floods in wet seasons, and
increased economic activity have motivated new infrastructure to
regulate flow in the basin. Proposed infrastructure includes single
and multi-purpose dams for hydropower, large-scale irrigation
schemes and public water supply.
Figure 1 shows the most relevant built and natural assets
(existing and planned) in the basin. Existing built infrastructure
includes the Kanozoe, Ziga, Loumbila, Bagre Dams in the
White Volta, Kompienga dam in the Oti, Bui dam in the
Black Volta, and Akosombo and Kpong dams in the Lower
Volta, and associated irrigation schemes. Existing natural assets
includes the floodplain downstream of Pwalugu, which floods
annually when the White Volta river overflows, distributing
water and sediments beyond the riverbanks. The floodplain
supports local communities’ livelihoods enabling flood recession
agriculture (FRA), pond fishing, year-round domestic water
supply and grazing grounds for livestock during the dry season
(Mul et al., 2017).
The PMD is being implemented in the White Volta sub-basin
in the Upper East region of Ghana, downstream of the Bagre
Dam in Burkina Faso (Mosello et al., 2017; Baah-Kumi and Ward,
2020). The project is managed by the Volta River Authority
(VRA), in collaboration with the Ghana Irrigation Development
Authority (GIDA) and funded by the Ghanaian government. The
PMD is expected to contribute to the development of Northern
Ghana, one of the countries’ poorest regions (Darko et al., 2019).
According to Volta River Authority (2018) the PMD has the
potential to irrigate 20,000 ha and to produce 176 GWh. Another
function of the PMD would be flood protection resulting from
intense rainfall events in northern Ghana, exacerbated by spills
from the Bagre Dam (Darko et al., 2019).
Context for the Development of Pwalugu
Dam
The Volta river basin in West Africa is shared between six
countries with Ghana and Burkina Faso covering over 80% of
the area and where most of the large water infrastructures in
the basin are found (Mul et al., 2015). Water resources in the
basin provide essential services that support the economies of
its riparian communities and wider countries (Mul et al., 2015,
2017). Ecosystem services and water resources infrastructure in
the basin facilitate food production, access to renewable and
cheap energy via hydropower, flood protection and provision
of water for industrial and domestic use (Baah-Kumi and
Ward, 2020). In the last two decades Ghana and Burkina Faso
have experienced significant economic and population growth
putting increased pressure on their water resources. This led
the two governments and the transboundary basin agency, the
Volta Basin Authority (VBA), to consider developing some
new infrastructure to control and increase water availability
in the basin as well as provide other benefits such as
increased food production via formal irrigation schemes and
hydropower. The VBA is a basin-wide institution that, among
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FIGURE 1 | Volta river basin. Location of infrastructure in the six-country river basin.
other mandates, is developing a transboundary cooperative
institutional framework to guide future water use in the multi-
country basin (Baah-Kumi and Ward, 2020).
The PMD is located on the White Volta sub-basin close
to the Pwalugu village in the Upper East region of Ghana,
downstream of the Bagre Dam in Burkina Faso (Mosello et al.,
2017; Baah-Kumi and Ward, 2020). The main benefit of the
dam is considered to be hydropower production, which is
aimed at increasing energy connectivity in the northern regions
of the country. The dam will also, provide flood protection,
food production and employment via a new irrigation scheme.
As an energy exporting country, Ghana would benefit from
increasing overall hydropower production, which also supplies
Burkina Faso. However, while providing these benefits, the
PMD could disrupt the current flow regime which allows
FRA and pond fishing (Mul et al., 2017). Also, reduced
downstream water availability because of increased water storage,
evaporation and irrigation water use may reduce hydropower
production downstream at Akosombo (Baah-Kumi and Ward,
2020). Furthermore, the PMD itself could be impacted by the
operation of the existing Bagre Dam or expansion of the irrigated
area upstream in Burkina Faso. Ideally these dams would be
operated jointly to maximise the benefits to both countries and
to limit negative impacts. However, despite the existence of the
transboundary VBA basin-wide agency, current management
and development initiatives amongst the riparian countries are
relatively uncoordinated (Baah-Kumi and Ward, 2020). For
example, historically, more than 80% of the annual inflow into the
Bagre Dam is spilt during peaks flow periods (August/September)
(Mul et al., 2017; Darko et al., 2019) contributing to flooding
in Northern Ghana. Floods in Northern Ghana have led to the
deaths of more than 63 people and displaced over 100,000 in
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addition to causing widespread damage to farmlands, roads,
houses, and bridges (Davies, 2018; IFRC, 2019). According to
Baah-Kumi and Ward (2020), Ghana and Burkina Faso have
agreed that Burkina Faso will provide 2 weeks’ notice before
the start of annual Bagre Dam spillage in late August or
early September, allowing Ghana take mitigation measures to
reduce flood damage.
METHODS AND TOOLS
The framework presented in this study (Figure 2) is composed
of three stages. Stage 1 formulates the planning and management
problem and identifies historical operating rules when
information about them is not available. The policy identification
step calibrates a river basin simulation model representing
existing infrastructure to available historical data via many-
objective optimisation; in the literature this has also been
referred to as “direct policy search” (Giuliani et al., 2014). This
identifies operating policies for existing infrastructure that
reproduce the system’s historical operation under the observed
inflow, release, and storage volume time series. In Stage 2,
two scenarios, cooperative and historical non-cooperative, are
defined and a robust many-objective direct policy search is
implemented to design new infrastructure operating policies for
both existing and planned assets. In Stage 3 evaluation of the
operational policies over an ensemble of plausible futures and
sensitivity analysis are conducted.
FIGURE 2 | Schematic of the proposed framework.
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The cooperative scenario represents a situation where there
is a central water management institution in the basin (as is the
case of the Volta river basin) and where the countries and the
infrastructure operators agree management strategies of existing
and future infrastructure. This scenario also assumes all data is
shared (inflows, water demands, water withdrawals, and future
developments) across the basin. This assumption is not always
met in practice given the political and institutional settings
in many transboundary basins (Giuliani and Castelletti, 2013).
However, according to Sadoff and Grey (2009) an integration
scenario that recognises the opportunities for distribution of
benefits and costs, and the different alternatives of cooperation,
is a worthy goal of integrated water resources management.
The historical non-cooperative scenario assumes there is no
cooperation between the riparian countries and infrastructure
operators with regards to reservoir operation. Here, the upstream
countries maximise their benefits without consideration of the
impacts on the downstream countries built or natural assets.
Volta River Basin Simulation Model
The river basin simulation uses the Python Water Resources
model (Pywr), a Python-based water resources system simulator
freely available as an open-source Python library (Tomlinson
et al., 2020). Pywr is an optimisation-driven simulator and solves
a linear program at every simulation time-step to allocate water
to different nodes by minimising allocation penalties. The model
can be summarised by a mass balance equation Eq. (1) solved at
each node in the network representing incremental catchment
inflow and water demands at ecosystem service delivery and
infrastructure locations:











where, St,n is the volume of water stored in the reservoirs at
node n, in time-step t; uit,n represents the water allocation for the
water uses (i) in the system, namely public water supply (pws),
hydropower (hp), and irrigation schemes (is). Irrigation demand
is defined by the water demand of each crop (ct) integrating an
irrigation scheme whilst spt,n denotes spill flows from reservoirs;
qt,n represents the inflows to the nodes and e(·)t,n represent
evaporation, which uses on the water level ht,n in the reservoir
to determine its real-time surface area using a bathymetry curve.
CR is the network connectivity matrix in the system [CRj,k =
1 (−1) where node j receives water from (to) node k]. For
releases to consumptive water uses (mainly irrigation uses), the
network connectivity matrix tracks possible flows that return to
the network as a fraction of the release.
Figure 3 shows the network schematic of the Volta river
basin simulation model, and a screenshot of an online model
deployment (Knox et al., 2019) which allows its access
by collaborating parties. The model includes the existing
infrastructure in the basin and the proposed PMD project
(Table 1). Existing built infrastructure in Burkina Faso includes
the Kanozoe dam and attached Yako irrigation scheme; the
Loumbila dam that provides water to an irrigation scheme and
public water supply to Ouagadougou the capital of Burkina
Faso; the Ziga dam provides most of the public water supply to
Ouagadougou and the Bagre Dam that produces hydropower and
provides water to an existing irrigation scheme. Modelled existing
infrastructure in Ghana includes the Bui dam and attached
irrigation scheme; the Akosombo dam and the Kpong run-of-
river hydropower plant and an irrigation scheme associated to
Kpong. Also, aggregated public water supply for the Ghana Water
Company Limited is modelled downstream of the PMD near the
city of Tamale as well as aggregated abstractions from Lake Volta
and an abstraction downstream of Kpong for Accra.
Modelled natural assets include FRA and pond fishing,
downstream of the PMD. These benefits are made possible by the
annual flood that occurs during the rainy season. Floods deposit
nutrients that replenish the soil, enabling the practice of FRA
TABLE 1 | Summary of the existing and future built and natural infrastructure.
Name Type Size Use Status
Kanozoe Built Storage: 75 Mm3 Irrigation, Fishing Existing
Irrigation: 5,319 ha





Ziga Built Storage: 470 Mm3 Fishing, Public
water supply
Existing
Kompienga Built Storage: 2,020 Mm3 Hydropower Existing
Hydropower: 14 MW































Built Up to 50,000 ha - Planned
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by the local inhabitants. As the flood recedes, depressions in the
banks are left with residual floodwater containing fish, allowing
residents to perform pond fishing during an annual ceremony
(Mul et al., 2017).
Performance Metrics
Performance metrics quantify the benefits generated by the built
and natural assets in the Volta river basin. Metrics include annual
and firm hydropower production, irrigation yield, prescribed
environmental flows downstream of the PMD, and FRA benefits.
The flood recession pond fishing benefit was considered in
the simulation model, however, it was not incorporated in the
optimisation process. The impact analysis on natural assets
was focused on FRA because this activity represented greater
financial benefits compared to the flood recession and pond
fishing benefits.
Hydropower Generation
The Volta water model quantifies the average Annual Energy
production [GWh year−1], and the Firm Power at 90%




























where, HPt,n is the hydropower generation; η is the turbine
efficiency [%] (Akosombo = 0.93, Kompienga = 0.85, Bagre = 0.8,
Bui = 0.85, Pwalugu = 0.9 and Kpong = 0.93); g is the gravitational
acceleration constant, 9.8 m s−2; γw is the water density [kg
m−3]; ht,n is the net hydraulic head [m]; T is the simulation time
horizon and 4 represents the hydrological ensemble. Finally,
f AEn and f
FP
n are the average Annual Energy and Firm Power
metrics, respectively.
Irrigation
Benefits of formal irrigation schemes are represented by irrigation
yield. Each scheme’s irrigation water demand and yield are
estimated by using the Crop Water Requirements method






























where, CWRt,n is the crop water requirement per node
(irrigation scheme) and per month (m ∈ t). Kct,(ct∈n),
ETot,(ct∈n), and Rt,n are the monthly crop water coefficient,
effective evapotranspiration [mm day−1] per crop and effective
precipitation [mm day−1], obtained from Sadick et al. (2015),
respectively. A(ct∈n) is the area [ha] reserved for each crop type.
IWRt,n is the monthly irrigation water requirement per irrigation
scheme, αct and βct are the overall irrigation and conveyance
efficiencies, assumed to be 0.8 and 0.7, respectively. CRt,n is a
curtailment ratio, yn is the annual yield [ton/ha] per irrigation
scheme. Finally, f Yn is the average irrigation yield metric per
irrigation scheme.
Environmental Flow
The environmental flow was calculated as a minimum flow that
is exceeded 95% of the time according to PMD feasibility study
(Volta River Authority, 2018), Eq. (9).












where, qt,n is the flow downstream [Mm3 day−1] of the PMD
and f EFn is the environmental flow metric, maximised in the policy
identification process under the hydrological ensemble 4.
Flood Recession Agriculture
Flood recession agriculture is dependent on the seasonal flooding
of the floodplain during the peak of the rainy season (July–
September). The magnitude of the annual peak (August or
September) determines the total area sown by locals each year
(Balana et al., 2015). Low flood peaks do not result in the
river overflowing the banks, preventing FRA activities. Once
the flooding threshold is breached, the flooded area increases
with increasing flood peak. Extreme floods can negatively affect
FRA by removing the fertile topsoil. Therefore, the area suitable












Yn = An(qFRAn )fFRACy (11)







where, qFRAn is the average annual flow in August or September
during the simulation horizon; qt, n is the flow in August and
September; An(·) is the flooded area [ha]; fFRA is a suitability
factor (Balana et al., 2015); Cy is the crop yield [ton ha−1]
assuming a typical FRA crop mix of maize, beans, Bambara beans,
soya, millet and groundnuts (Sidibé et al., 2016); Yn is the total
FRA yield [ton year−1]; βFRA is the average regional market price
of the crops at $1,222 ton−1 (Pettinotti, 2017). Finally, f FRAn is the
benefit of the FRA activity.
Policy Identification
To evaluate the impact of new infrastructure operation it is
necessary to identify and simulate the historical operational
strategy of the existing infrastructure in the basin. Here, we use
an explicit policy identification approach (Khadem et al., 2020),
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FIGURE 3 | Panel (A) shows the Volta river basin simulation model schematic, and panel (B) shows a screenshot of the WaterStrategy online interface (Knox et al.,
2019) which allows collaborative development and use of the Python water resource simulation model (Pywr).
which requires a historical time series to estimate the operating
rules of the existing infrastructure. The policy identification uses
many-objective direct policy search to approximate operating
rules of existing infrastructure using quantitative statistics
metrics as objectives (Moriasi et al., 2007).
Operating Rules
We employed Gaussian radial basis functions (RBF) to model
system operating rules. RBFs have shown good performance
representing functions for a large class of problems, including
reservoir storage and time into release decisions (Giuliani et al.,
2014, 2016b; Zatarain Salazar et al., 2017; Geressu and Harou,












where m = 2 is the number of input variables x (namely time and
reservoir level); l is the number of RBFs (l = 4); wi is the weight
of the ith RBF (ϕi); cj,i, and bj,i are the m-dimensional centres and
radius vectors of the ith RBF, respectively. The centres and radius
include: cj,i ∈ [−1, 1] bj,i ∈ [0, 1] wj,i ∈ [0, 1]
∑n
i=1 wi = 1.





details we refer the reader to Giuliani et al. (2014).
Historical Many-Objective Optimisation
Similar to Giuliani et al. (2016a) this study applies direct policy
search, where the operating policy is parametrised using Gaussian
RBF and then the parameters of the RBF are optimised using
many-objective optimisation using the system’s performance
metrics (section “Performance Metrics”) as objectives. In this
work, in addition to optimising the operating policy parameters
to maximise the system’s metrics, we used the Nash-Sutcliffe
efficiency metric to calibrate the operating policy parameters
such that they reproduce observed reservoir volume time-series.











= Bagre, Bui, Kompienga, and Akosombo (14)
where, f NSn is the Nash-Sutcliffe objective; θn is the vector of
decision variables which are the parameters for the reservoir
operating rules. The objective function F (·) vector is obtained
by simulating the Volta river basin simulation model over the
horizon T and the historical hydrologic scenario under the set
of operating rules (θn) defined by the search algorithm.
Policy Optimisation
Historical Non-cooperative Scenario
The historical non-cooperative scenario is based on the Policy
identification stage, where operating rules for existing dams
were identified under historical hydrological conditions. This
scenario assumes business as usual with dam operators focussing
maximising their own benefits. In this scenario, the PMD
maximises its benefits without consideration of the impacts
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on the downstream built infrastructure. We represent this
scenario by a many-objective robust optimisation formulation
that maximises the benefits generated by the operation of the
new PMD and the downstream natural assets over a hydrological
ensemble. In this study, robust optimisation is employed
where the performance metric values of the simulations over
hydrological scenario ensemble are aggregated into a single
percentile value statistically (Herman et al., 2015; Kwakkel et al.,
2016; McPhail et al., 2018). In this formulation the operating
policies for existing infrastructure identified in stage 1 are static.
Eq. (15) present the objective vector to be optimised:
F (θn) =
(










n = PMD (15)
where, θn is the vector of decision variables which are the
parameters of the PMD operating rules. The objective function
F (·) vector is obtained by simulating the Volta river basin
simulation model over the horizon T and the hydrological
ensemble 4 under the set of operating rules (θn) defined by the
search algorithm.
Cooperative Scenario
This scenario assumes practical coordination and collaboration
amongst the riparian countries and infrastructure operators,
where institutional integration allows revising and possibly
modifying the operation of existing dams to maximise basin-
wide benefits. For the analysis, we only considered the Bagre
and Akosombo dams because these two dams are upstream and
downstream, respectively, of the PMD. The operation for the Bui
and the Kompienga dams is considered static and uses operating















= Bagre, PMD, and Akosombo (16)
where, θn is the vector of decision variables of the operating
rules for the Bagre, PMD, and Akosombo reservoirs. Note, that
the cooperative scenario formulation only includes the objectives
f Yn , f
EF
n , and q
FRA





are calculated for the Bagre, PMD and Akosombo reservoirs.
Similar to the historical non-cooperative scenario, the objective
function F (·) vector is obtained by simulating the Volta river
basin simulation model over the horizon T and the hydrological
ensemble 4 under the set of operating rules (θn) defined by the
search algorithm.
Hydrological Inputs
The Volta river basin simulation model requires historical inflow
time-series and possible future hydrological scenarios to perform
the Policy identification and the Policy optimisation, respectively.
The historical inflow scenario is used to simulate and identify
the historical system operation. Meanwhile, the possible future
scenarios are used to evaluate the alternative policies over a wide
range of hydrological conditions.
For the historical inflow scenario, given the lack of long-
term observational flow data at all upstream reservoir locations,
we used a reconstruction of the monthly historical naturalised
river flows in the basin derived from a hydrological model,
following Lin et al. (2019). We used the incremental flows at
each dam location to represent the inflows to the reservoirs.
Additionally, this historical scenario was used to generate a
stochastic ensemble (4) of hydrologic realisations for each
reservoir located in the basin. We used the synthetic streamflow
generation method proposed by Kirsch et al. (2013), which relies
on Cholesky decomposition to maintain autocorrelation, and a
bootstrap resampling technique to preserve multisite correlation
(Herman et al., 2016).
Computational Experiment
For the Policy identification and the Policy optimisation we
linked the Volta river basin simulation model to the Borg MOEA
(Hadka and Reed, 2013) algorithm to solve the many-objective
optimisation problem. This identifies the Pareto-approximate
(“best achievable for any combination of priorities between
objectives”) set of reservoir system operating rules and quantifies
the trade-offs between performance objectives that they imply.
Borg has been shown to successfully handle complex, non-
linear, and non-concave problems when searching for non-
dominated solutions (Hadka and Reed, 2012; Zatarain Salazar
et al., 2016). We used the default algorithm parametrisation,
with an initial population of 100 individuals. Additionally, we set
epsilon values equal to 1.0 for annual energy production, 0.1 for
firm power, 0.05 for irrigation yield, 0.05 for environmental flow
and 0.05 for FRA.
The Volta basin simulation model runs on a weekly time
step (t) over a 20-year time horizon (T = 20 years) for both
the historical and 30-member future ensemble (4). The Policy
identification and the Policy optimisation were run for 10
random seeds where each seed was run over 400,000 function
evaluations (i.e., 4,000,000 simulations for the hydrological
ensemble). The final Pareto-approximate curve is obtained as the
set of non-dominated solutions from the combined results of
all optimisations.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
First Stage: Historical Operation
Identification
We use historical observed reservoir storage time series to
identify the historical policy operating of existing infrastructure.
Daily data were available for the Akosombo reservoir (01/01/1991
to 12/31/2010) and monthly data for the Bagre reservoir
(01/01/2000 to 12/31/2010). In addition to the Nash-Sutcliffe
efficiency objectives used to identify the reservoir operation for
Akosombo and Bagre, we use system performance metrics (see
section “Performance Metrics”) to identify the operation for
the reservoirs Bui and Kompienga, where historical time series
were not available.
Figure 4 shows the historical observed versus the simulated
volume for the Akosombo and Bagre reservoirs. The operating
policy for the existing reservoirs was selected based on the
maximum values for the Nash-Sutcliffe metric obtained in
the optimisation process, 0.75 and 0.63 for the Akosombo
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FIGURE 4 | Comparison of observed and simulated reservoir volumes used for policy identification. Panel (A) shows the observed and simulated volume for the
Akosombo reservoir, and panel (B) shows the observed and simulated volume for the Bagre reservoir.
and Bagre Nash-Sutcliffe metrics, respectively. According to
Moriasi et al. (2007), these results are classified as good and
satisfactory, respectively. In general, the historical operating
policy can reproduce the seasonality of both reservoirs. The
storage volume is reduced every year almost to the minimum
operating level in July and reservoirs fill in the wet season.
However, in some years modelled storage is overestimated or
underestimated and in the case of the Bagre reservoir, modelled
storage reaches lower troughs as compared to the observed data.
This is because the inflow time-series used by the simulation
model are taken from the hydrological model and are subject to
errors in their year-to-year variability.
Second Stage: Design and Adaptation of
System Infrastructure Operation Policies
In the second phase of the method, we identify Pareto-
approximate PMD reservoir release operating rules under two
scenarios, historical non-cooperative and cooperative, where, in
the non-cooperative, the Bagre and the Akosombo operating
policies are held constant. Whilst in the cooperative we
allowed Bagre and Akosombo operating policies to adapt to
the new built infrastructure (the PMD) to maximise overall
basin benefits. Results of the historical non-cooperative and
cooperative scenarios (Figure 5) are visualised using a parallel
plot (Inselberg, 1997). In Figure 5, each vertical axis represents
an objective in the optimisation formulation whilst each coloured
line represents a non-dominated operating policy portfolio
for each new and existing dam. That point at which each
coloured line intersects each respective vertical axis represents the
performance of that policy in that objective. An ideal solution in
the figure would lead to a straight horizontal line that intersects
every axis at the top. Crossing lines between axes indicate
trade-offs between two adjacent objectives. The “Ghana Average
Energy” axis represents a non-optimised metric which is the
sum of the Pwalugu and Akosombo average energy objectives.
This metric is visualised in the figure to show the impacts of
the upstream reservoirs’ operation (Bagre and Pwalugu) on the
overall energy production in Ghana.
The full set of non-dominated portfolios for the historical non-
cooperative and cooperative scenarios are presented in light blue
and light red, respectively. We selected two policy portfolios from
the historical non-cooperative scenario (solid and dashed line
in blue) to evaluate in detail. The portfolio represented by the
solid blue line achieves the highest PMD average energy 197.2
[GWh year−1] in the set of historical non-cooperative portfolios,
whilst at the same time the flow (at 95% exceedance) downstream
of the PMD is greater than the minimum environmental flow
(0.18 Mm3 day−1) requirement (Volta River Authority, 2018).
The dashed line corresponds to an operating policy that achieves
the highest PMD firm power 13.5 [MW]. Both operating policies,
however, fall in the lower range of FRA benefits generating 9.3
[$M year−1] and 6.3 [$M year−1] for the portfolios represented
by the solid and dashed lines, respectively. As under in the
historical non-cooperative scenario we employed static operating
policies for the Bagre and Akosombo dams (identified in the
Policy identification stage), their range of performance is small
across all Pareto-approximate policies.
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FIGURE 5 | Parallel axis plot comparing the historical non-cooperative and cooperative scenario. Light blue and light red are the full set of non-dominated solutions
for the historical non-cooperative and cooperative scenario, respectively. Blue solid and dashed lines are selected portfolios of the historical non-cooperative
scenario and the black and solid red lines are filtered portfolios of the cooperative scenario. Vertical thick black bars over parts of the first, fourth and eighth axes are
“filters” which allow selecting a subset of the efficient designs in the plot. The Akosombo average energy [4,457.8 GWh year−1] of the historical policy, identified in
the First Stage, is shown with a black star.
Cooperation between the two riparian countries is more likely
to occur if both countries receive a net benefit as a result of
the cooperation (Sadoff and Grey, 2009; Jeuland et al., 2017).
The solutions for the cooperative scenario are filtered such
that those that only increase energy generation from Bagre in
Burkina Faso 51.1 [GWh year−1], and energy generation in
Ghana 4151.3 [GWh year−1] as compared to the historical
non-cooperative scenario are seen in bold colours. We also
filter out all policies that result in flows downstream of the
PMD that are greater than 0.18 [Mm3 day−1], the minimum
environmental flow identified in Volta River Authority (2018).
Amongst the remaining cooperative solutions, we select two
the “Built Infrastructure portfolio” represented by the solid
black line maximises Ghana Average energy (producing 4490.7
[GWh year−1]) whilst the “compromise portfolio” represented
by the dashed black line maximises ecosystem services in
Northern Ghana by maximising FRA benefits (generating 22.5
[$M year−1]).
Figure 5 shows how that energy generation and firm power
from the Akosombo dam may be impacted if the historical
operating policies of existing dams are not adapted to the new
flow regime resulting from PMD development (blue lines). The
filtered cooperative portfolios (red lines) show that implementing
cooperative operating policies results in Akosombo hydropower
benefits (average energy and firm power) being less negatively
impacted than if non-cooperative policies were implemented. In
addition, hydropower benefits at Bagre can be increased, and
environmental flows downstream of the PMD can be maintained.
According to Baah-Kumi and Ward (2020), the PMD
development may impact Akosombo operation because the
inflows to Lake Volta could be reduced due to increasing
water storage, water demands and evaporation upstream of
Lake Volta. Our analysis confirms this conclusion; however,
Figure 5 shows that the negative impact of Akosombo
could be greater without the coordinated infrastructure
management. For example, Akosombo average energy is
reduced by 11.5% from the energy generated historically
(black star in Figure 5), in the selected non-cooperative
scenarios. However, if cooperative policies are implemented
this impact is reduced to only 3.6% (solid black line in
the Figure 5). This policy achieves a positive net energy
production of 0.74% in Ghana and 6.2% for Bagre in
Burkina Faso (see Figure 5). The FRA benefits are reduced
by 63.5% from the historical 25.2 [$M year−1], in the selected
non-cooperative portfolio (solid blue line). Whilst under
the cooperative portfolio, which maximises hydropower
benefits (solid black line) the FRA benefits are reduced by
69.4%. However, note that under the compromise operating
policy (dashed black line), the FRA benefits could be
reduced only by 10.7%.
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Third Stage: Implications for
Infrastructure Operation on the Volta
River Basin
To investigate the possible range of benefits generated in
the Volta basin with the identified operating policies we
performed a sensitivity analysis by simulating the system over
100 hydrological scenarios. Policies considered in this analysis
include the selected cooperative and non-cooperative policies
as well as those in the entire cooperative filtered set in
Figure 5.
Figure 6 shows the exceedance curves for the different metrics
and different operating policies. Figures 6A,B visualize the PMD
hydropower metrics while Figures 6C,D show metrics related to
the new irrigation scheme and the impact to the environmental
services – FRA – downstream of the PMD at Pwalugu in the
FIGURE 6 | Probability of exceedance curves for different metrics in the system. Panel (A) shows the Pwalugu Average energy, panel (B) shows the Pwalugu Firm
Power, panel (C) shows the Pwalugu Irrigation Yield, panel (D) shows the Pwalugu Flood Recession Agriculture (FRA), panel (E) shows the Bagre Average energy,
and panel (F) shows the Akosombo Average energy. The PMD average energy and firm power design (Volta River Authority, 2018) is displayed in panels (A,B),
respectively.
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FIGURE 7 | Reservoirs operation. Panel (A,C,E) show the mean value under the hydrological scenarios and the standard deviation (light blue and grey area) of the
stimulated reservoir volume in Bagre, Pwalugu, and Akosombo, respectively. Panel (B,D,F) show the mean value under the hydrological scenarios and the standard
deviation of the simulated energy production for the Bagre, Pwalugu, and Akosombo dams, respectively.
Upper East Region of Ghana. Finally, Figures 6C,F show the
average energy produced at Bagre and Akosombo, respectively.
In general, the exceedance curves show that the operating policies
identified by the cooperative scenario perform better according
to almost all metrics for all hydrological scenarios. The selected
cooperative policy that maximises Ghana Average energy (solid
black line in Figure 6) shows that the Pwalugu average energy
and firm power (Figures 6A,B) is 162.7 [GWh year−1] and 5.1
[MW] at 90% of exceedance, respectively. Note that the PMD
was designed to produce 176 [GWh year−1] with a firm power
of 16 [MW]. According to our results the designed annual energy
is achieved at only 77% exceedance under the same cooperative
policy (Figure 6A).
Figures 6C,D, show that a trade-off exists between irrigation
yield and FRA downstream the PMD. Policies that result in
higher benefits in FRA in Pwalugu result in lower irrigation
yields from the formal irrigation scheme associated with the
PMD. For example, if the selected cooperative policies (solid
and dashed black lines) are compared, the formal irrigation yield
under the cooperative policy that maximises Ghana Average
energy is 596.0 [kton year−1] at 90% of exceedance whilst the
FRA benefit is 8.7 [$M year−1]. However, under the portfolio
that maximises the FRA benefits, the formal irrigation yield is
reduced to 526.9 [kton year−1] and the FRA benefits increase to
21.6 [$M year−1]. The flood recession ecosystem services benefits
occur downstream of the PMD in the floodplains. The irrigation
system abstracts water downstream of the PMD hydropower
releases. These abstractions result in smaller downstream floods
and lower overall flood recession benefits, implying there is
direct competition between formal and informal irrigation.
Figures 6E,F show the Bagre and the Akosombo average energy
production in the cooperative scenario outperform the energy
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production in the historical non-cooperative scenario under all
hydrologic scenarios.
Figure 7 shows five-operation-years for the Bagre, Pwalugu,
and Akosombo reservoirs, for the operating policy represented
by the black and blue solid lines under the hydrological scenarios.
Figures 7A,C,E show the mean value under the scenarios and the
standard deviation (light blue and grey area in Figure 7) for the
simulated reservoir volume in Bagre, Pwalugu, and Akosombo,
respectively. While Figures 7B,D,F show the same information
but for the simulated energy production for the Bagre, Pwalugu,
and Akosombo dams.
According to Figures 7A,E, the mean volume for Akosombo
and Bagre follow a similar seasonal operating pattern as
compared to the historical operation of both reservoirs (see
section “First Stage: Historical Operation Identification”), where
reservoir storages reduce to lower volumes in the dry season
and fill in the wet season. However, building and operating
the PMD under the selected cooperative policy (black line)
results in lower volumes in Akosombo in all seasons compared
to the historical operation without the PMD development
(see Figure 4). This results from the increase in upstream
storage, water consumption, and evaporation and the increased
hydropower generation in peak flow periods (see Figure 7F)
to maintain historical energy generation levels. The Pwalugu
reservoir operation follows a similar seasonal pattern to the
Bagre reservoir, where the storage volume is reduced every
year almost to the minimum operating level in July and
reservoirs fill in the wet season. However, this operation for
Pwalugu is more pronounced (lower reservoir volumes) in the
cooperative scenario. This could potentially reduce flood peaks
downstream of the PMD by increasing Pwalugu’s capacity to
buffer possible spills from Bagre protecting from floods in
Northern Ghana. However reducing the flood peak would also
reduce the ecosystem-services derived from this flood (i.e., FRA)
(see Figure 7D) and (Figure 6D), as well as increase risks that the
dam is not able to refill in some years.
Under the cooperative policy (black line), on average Bagre
operates at a lower volume and increases its hydropower
generation during peak flow periods, as compared to the
historical non-cooperative scenario (see Figures 7A,B).
This added to steady Pwalugu hydropower releases (see
Figure 7D) increases the water availability downstream
minimising the negative impacts on the Akosombo energy
production, as compared to the non-cooperative scenario.
However, increasing energy production in Bagre during
peak flows reduce its ability to generate hydropower during
off-peak flows periods (Figure 7B). This could possibly
increase energy import dependency in Burkina Faso during
these periods despite total annual generation by Bagre being
greater in the cooperative scenario. This possible negative
impact for Burkina Faso could be offset by increasing
energy trades between Ghana and Burkina Faso during
those periods.
Future Work and Limitations
The analysis presented in this paper considers hydrologic
uncertainty within the robust optimisation. The stochastic
ensemble used in the optimisation process is based on the
historical flow regime in the basin. Climate change may modify
this flow regime and could impact the long-term robustness
of the operating policies identified in the study. Future studies
could apply the proposed framework under climate change
uncertainty to identify cooperative water strategies that are
robust to climate change and support long-term sustainable
water resources management. Another potential direction for
future research could be to explore the impacts of political
or economic uncertainty or the consequences of deviation
from operating agreements by each party via optimisation or
sensitivity analysis.
CONCLUSION
This paper explores the multiple potential impacts of the
proposed Pwalugu Multipurpose Dam (PMD) could have on
existing infrastructure and water services of the Volta river basin.
We presented a novel framework that links river basin simulation
to many-objective search to approximate existing operating
rules and design new ones in the presence of complex multi-
actor trade-offs. The approach identifies benefits of collaborative
management in systems where current river management is not
codified in formal regulations, as is the case in many multi-
region river basins in the global south. We evaluated the possible
impacts that new development could impose on ecosystem
services and downstream infrastructure and how the PMD itself
could be impacted by different operating strategies of the existing
upstream Bagre Dam in Burkina Faso under two alternative
scenarios assuming cooperation and non-cooperation.
Results indicate that the PMD has the potential to reduce
inflows into the Akosombo dam. This would likely have a
negative impact on hydropower generation from Akosombo,
with up to 11.5% reduction in energy generation compared to
the case without the PMD. However, if cooperative infrastructure
operation is adopted, the impact could be reduced by only 3.6%,
and result in a positive net energy production of 0.74% in
Ghana overall and a 6.2% increase for Bagre Dam hydropower
production in Burkina Faso. Environmental services in Northern
Ghana may also be impacted in a non-cooperative operation
scenario decreasing floods downstream of the PMD and possibly
reducing benefits to local communities that depend directly
on flood recession activities. Under a cooperative scenario, the
Bagre reservoir could increase hydropower releases during peak
flow periods increasing its total net annual generation. This
operative strategy could increase water availability downstream
of the PMD minimising the negative impacts on Akosombo
energy production, resulting in net positive energy production
in Ghana even after constructing the PMD. However, such
a strategy could reduce Bagre energy generation during low
flow periods increasing Burkina Faso’s dependence on energy
imports from Ghana during the dry season, despite the
higher overall total annual generation. Results showed there is
room for riparian countries to negotiate cooperative strategies
to offset possible negative impacts generated by the new
PMD. The PMD provides an opportunity for the VBA to
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implement cooperative operational water management
strategies in the basin.
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